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Recent Developments

ARMS CONTROL-Superpower Relations in the New Europe

The rapid process of political transformation in Eastern Europe,
dubbed by President Bush the "Revolution of '89,"1 has led to a
radical reassessment of the superpower approach to arms control. This
reassessment of arms control policy has, in part, been driven by the
devolution of power within the Eastern and Western alliances. The
rise of multilateralism has significantly complicated previous negotiating strategies.
Post-World War II policy has been dictated by hostile ideological
conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the Warsaw Pact. This historical ideological conflict has been dramatically reduced: noncommunist governments are in place in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) (where re-unification with the
Federal Republic of German (FRG) is impending), Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The states of the Warsaw Pact, no
longer acting in concert as a unified military bloc, are not considered
interested in or even capable of mounting a surprise attack on Western
2
Europe.
Such a dramatic transformation, according to President Bush, "absolutely mandates new thinking," especially with respect to arms
control. 3 Conventional and strategic arms control negotiations which
have languished for over a decade might now yield agreements by the
end of 1990. The impetus for this recommitment derives, in part,
from decisions taken by President Bush4 and President Gorbachev at
the December 1989, summit in Malta.
The outlook for reduction in conventional forces in Europe has been
brightened both by a superpower commitment to the Conventional

1. State of the Union: Transcriptof Bush's State of the Union Message to the Nation, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1990, at D22, col. 3.
2. Assessment made by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, reportedin Report Says
Soviet Cuts Would Delay Attack, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at A8, col. 3.
3. Excerpts from Bush's New Conference After N4ATO Meeting, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at
A17, col. 1 [hereinafter Excerpts].
4. McNulty & Mosely, Bush, GorbachevHail New Era: No Accords, But Talks End in Harmony,

Chicago Tribune, Dec. 4, 1989, at Cl.
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Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations' and, more importantly,
by unilateral reductions. Even before the democratic revolution in
Eastern Europe, Gorbachev had begun the trend toward unilateral
reductions by announcing plans to reduce domestic Soviet armed forces
by 500,000 men and Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe by 50,000
men.6
The new governmfents of Eastern Europe have quickened the pace
of unilateral and bilateral reductions outside the framework of the
CFE. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have already signed an
agreement mandating a complete withdrawl of Soviet troops from
Czechoslovakia. 7 Hungary and the Soviet Union are negotiating toward
a similar withdrawal of Soviet troops. 8 The Soviet Union has indicated
a willingness to discuss removing its 40,000 troops from Poland. 9
And the impending reunification of Germany will almost certainly
lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former German
Democratic Republic.' 0 President Gorbachev has indicated that all
Soviet forces will probably be out of Eastern Europe by the year 2000.11
The new Eastern European governments are also unilaterally cutting
their own armed forces and defense budgets. For example, Hungary
will diminish its forces by 8.8% this year and by 20-25% next year;
it will also scrap some 250 tanks and 430 artillery pieces. 12 Even
deeper cuts are likely in most of the Warsaw Pact states as the agendas
of.the newly elected governments turn to desperately needed economic
restructuring.
These unilateral reductions have led some to question the necessity
and even the desirability of a CFE accord. Arguably, Soviet troop
5. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations began in March 1989, with
the objective of reducing conventional forces throughout Europe, "from the Atlantic to the

Urals." The CFE negotiations quickly made more progress than the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) talks had made since beginning in 1973. The MBFR talks had only attempted
to cover arms reductions in Central Europe, and they were officially ended on February 2, 1989.

Sloan, Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Prospects for Accord, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCl
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, updated Feb. 16, 1990, at 4.

6. Gorbachev further outlined cuts of 50,000 tanks, 8500 artillery systems and 800 combat
aircraft in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region; withdrawl and disbandment of six tank divisions

from Eastern Europe; and generally restructuring the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe toward an
exclusively defensive posture. Id. at 6.
7- Herspring, Reassessingthe Warsaw Pact Threat: The East European Militaries,ARms CONTROL

TODAY, Mar. 1990, at 6, 9. The Czech agreement was entered into on February 20, 1990, and
calls for removal of all 73,500 Soviet troops by July 1, 1991.

8. id.
9. Id.
10. Mendelsohn, German Unification and European Security, ARms CONTROL TODAY, Mar,

1990, at 24, 26.
11. Herspring, supra note 7, at 12.
12. Id. at 8. Poland plans to reduce its troops by 33,000 men and to cut 850 tanks and 900

artillery pieces. The GDR will eliminate 10,000 men, 600 tanks, and a squadron of MIG-21
aircraft. Czechoslovakia has already eliminated 850 tanks, 165 armored personnel carriers, and
51 combat aircraft. Id.
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withdrawal from sovereign nations need not be negotiated for by the
United States; to do so may legitimize continued Soviet military
presence in Eastern Europe. 3 Nevertheless, NATO and the Bush
administration continue to support CFE as the best method of verifying
reductions and limiting Soviet troop presence west of the Ural
Mountains.

4
1

The CFE negotiations were originally conceived of as an attempt to
establish parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which has an
overwhelming quantitative advantage in its conventional forces. 15 The
most recent progress in the negotiations goes beyond this principle of
parity to establish an asymmetry in force strength that favors the
United States. ' 6 The agreement's asymmetry underscores the perceived
illegitimacy of the Soviet presence, as compared with the American
presence, and it emphasizes that the presence of United States troops
is not necessarily tied to that of the Soviet Union. 7 The extent of the
Soviet change in attitude may be gauged by the fact that their acceptance of asymmetry was "a virtual admission of the fact that their
forces are an army of occupation." 18
The agreement reached at the Open Skies conference was initially
designed to extend only to restrictions on Soviet and United States
forces. 9 With an eye toward a reunified Germany, the Soviets are
now, however, asserting the need for an overall central force limit of
700,000 to 750,000, which would constrain any growth by NATO
forces. 20 The proposal would have the indirect effect of limiting the
number of troops of a reunified Germany, a perceived necessity for the
13. Garfinkle, Why Deal When They'll Go Anyway; Conventional Forces: Bush's Plan will Give
the Soviets a Role in Europe that the East European Revolutions Have Already Denied Them, L.A.
Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at B7.
14. Woerner, We Still Need a Conventional Forces Treaty, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1990, at All.
15. Mendelsohn, CFE and a United Germany, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1990, at 2.
16. At the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa on February 13, 1990, the Soviet Union
accepted President Bush's proposal to limit Soviet and American troops in Central Europe (the
FRG, the GDR, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland) to 195,000 each, while allowing the U.S. an additional 30,000 men in the United
Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. See Friedman, Upheaval in the East; Moscow
Accepts U.S. Advantage of 30,000 Soldiers Across Europe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14 1990, at Al, col.

6. This view reflects American cognizance that Eastern European demands and German reunification may make it impossible for the Soviets to maintain any forces in Eastern Europe regardless
of CFE allowances, and it establishes a precedent for the U.S. forces to remain in Europe even
if the Soviets do not.
17. Feinstein, U.S., Soviets Agree on Troop Limit; Talks Set for German Unity, ARMs CONTROL
TODAY, Mar. 1990, at 19, 19.
18. Friedman, supra note 16, at Al, col. 6.
19. Statement of Raymond Garthoff, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former
Executive Director of the U.S. SALT I delegation, Feb. 21, 1990, press briefing, rerinted in
Ascent to the Summit: U.S.-Soviet Agreements in Moscow and Ottawa, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar.
1990, at 3, 6.
20. Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 26.
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Soviet Union and other countries concerned with restraining Ger21
many's military potential.
The Soviets' proposed overall force limit illustrates the increasingly
appreciated potential of the CFE to be used "as a vehicle for imposing
22
collective and multilateral ... constraints on a resurgent Germany."
Initial Western reaction to the Soviet proposal has been negative, but
the Soviets maintain that a final agreement is impossible until the
German question is addressed, whether through the overall force
proposal or some other means. 23 Consequently, it seems likely that "if
no agreement is reached on indirect limits ... within the CFE context,
the issue of national limits on German forces will be brought up
2
24
within the two-plus-four talks, or in conjunction with the CSCE, 5
or both. "26
A proposed "sufficiency" rule, under which no one state's forces
could exceed a certain percentage, probably around sixty percent, of
the total permitted to each alliance, 27 has the advantage of placing
the question of German force limits within the larger pan-European
context of the CFE negotiations. Neither the overall force limit nor
the "sufficiency" rule single out Germany for inequitable treatment.
28
FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl has insisted upon this approach.
Agreement in principle on the level of troop reductions, the most
pivotal issue in the talks, spurred resolution of other undecided CFE
issues toward reaching substantive accord by the fall 1990 date set by
Bush and Gorbachev at Malta, In January 1990 NATO submitted
proposals to the Warsaw Pact which addressed four key areas of
29
concern: tanks, armored combat vehicles, aircraft, and helicopters.
21. Feinstein, supra note 17, at 20.
22. Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 2.
23. Telephone Interview with Rob Leavitt, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies
(Apr. 18, 1990).
24. The "two-plus-four" talks will discuss the form German reunification will ultimately
take. The name derives from the fact that the participants in the negotiations will be the foreign
ministers of the two Germanies plus those of the four victorious World War II allies: the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. The negotiations began in April 1990. Friedman,
Moscow Reported to Yield on Neutrality of Germany; No Breakthrough on Arms, N.Y. Times, Apr.
7, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
25. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) comprises 35 states,
including all the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact plus the neutral and nonaligned
European states with the exception of Albania. Its most well-known accomplishment is the
1975 Helsinki Accord on human rights and government relations. Sloan, supra note 5, at 4.
26. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 26.
27. Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 2.
28. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 26.
29. Miller, Revised NATO Proposals Narrow CFE Gap, DEFENsE & DISARMAM ENT ALTERNATIvFS, Feb. 1990, at 6, 6. Disagreements over aircraft remain "the major issue holding up

a landmark agreement," as the Soviet Union continues to insist on the total exclusion from
calculation of bombers and land-based naval planes. Both sides, however, have been dropping
hints, that the issue of aircraft reductions could be eliminated from the treaty altogether if it
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Rapid negotiations in the first two months of 1990 have been
followed by slowed progress on the remaining disputed issues, most
notably the question of how to incorporate German military strength
into an agreement. The lull is attributable most directly to Soviet
unwillingess to make concessions beyond the overwhelmingly onesided reductions to which they have already agreed. 30 While Soviet
delays may be explained by the Kremlin preoccupation with the
Lithuanian crisis, its deeper roots lie in a growing military anxiety
about the great disparity in military strength that will result from the
agreement. 31 Many of the Soviet Union's earlier concessions were
predicated on the assumption of the continued viability of the Warsaw
Pact as a military alliance. 32 Since this assumption no longer seems
valid, the CFE treaty will leave the Soviet Union facing an array of
33
NATO nations with vastly superior force projection capabilities.
Nonetheless, the CFE agreement seems likely to proceed, albeit at a
somewhat slower pace.
The establishment of a comprehensive, reliable verification system
is a fundamental objective of the CFE negotiations. While differences
34
remain, the two sides agree on the basic approach to verification.
The greatest difficulty derives from the inherent complexity of "monitoring the deployment, storage, movement and destruction of tens of
thousands of weapons and . . . tracking tens of thousands of troops
...across the entire Atlantic-to-the-Urals region." 35 While unresolved
verification questions alone might not impede completion of a treaty,
36
the time constraints may lead to as simple an agreement as possible.
Nonetheless, "the rigorous, intrusive, permanent CFE ground-and airinspection regime," monitored by a joint-consultative group, would
constitute an important step in recent efforts to bolster confidence,
cooperation, and transparency in the European security system. 37 The
suggested joint-consultative group, in particular, "could be the first
building block in the construction of a more cooperative European
'38
security system.
Given the real possibility that a CFE treaty will be signed in the
next year, the next question becomes whether a further round of
proves
at Al,
30.
31.

too difficult to resolve by the tentative deadline of fall 1990. Friedman, supra note 24,
col. 6.
Leavitt Interview, supra note 23.
Id.

32. id.
33. Id.
34. Verification Moves to the Fore, VIENNAFAX, Mar. 21, 1990, at 1, 1 (R. Leavitt, ed.).
35. Id.
36. Sloan, Verifying Compliance with a Conventional Arms Control Accord: Considerations for
Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, revised Feb. 8, 1990, at 31.
37. Leavitt, supra note 34, at 1.
38. Sloan, supra note 36, at 38.
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conventional negotiations will take place, either in the form of a CFE
II or in some other context. Some Western defense experts and officials
have recommended against having a second round of conventional cuts
because it would make the NATO strategy of forward defense unrealizable. 39 President Bush has refused
to commit himself to anything
beyond the current negotiations. 40
Nonetheless, many consider an additional round of negotiations
likely and desirable. Political and budgetary pressures to decrease
military spending intensify because of the atmosphere of increased
cooperation and decreased military threat. Although the West should
benefit politically from the economic boost the reductions will give to
the fledgling Eastern European democracies, a CFE I accord will not
yield the financial savings demanded because the bulk of the force
reductions, and consequently the savings, are being made by the
Warsaw Pact. 41 For a deeper and more permanent shift to a defensive
orientation, the European security system, which would include not
only stationed forces, but the forces of the basing states as well, many
experts consider a second round of conventional cuts necessary. 42 Finally, additional conventional negotiations are considered by the FRG
and other states to be the most promising framework within which to
43
address growing anxiety about a unified Germany's military strength.
A second set of conventional reductions might aim for cuts in forces
of up to fifty percent, with an eye toward more dramatic goals including further reductions, the withdrawal of all foreign-stationed
troops, and the creation of genuinely nonoffensive defense forces on
all sides. 44 The framework of the negotiations would have to reflect
the changes that have taken place since CFE I was initiated; as Hungary
proposed in February 1990, the political and military independence
of the Warsaw Pact nations could be recognized by a system based on
individual states, and not simply allied blocs. 45 This approach could
also help advance a transition from NATO in its present form to more
Europe-based defense cooperation. 46 To this end, there is a growing
39. Leavitt & Miller, Doctrine Seminar Looks Beyond the Cold War, DEFENSE & DISARMAMENT
ALTERNATIVES, Jan. 1990, at 1, 2.
40. Excerpts, supra note 3, at A17, col. I (President Bush stated, "I'd like to get a CFE
I in
the bank first, get it locked up ....
We ought to manage that before we start the architecture
of something else."). Id.
41. Leavitt & Miller, supra note 39, at 2.

42. Hans Dietrich-Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Address at the CFE talks in Vienna, Jan. 25, 1990, reprinted in Gentcher Champions CSCE at
Framework for a New Euorpe, DEFENSE & DISARMAMENT ALTERNATIVES, Feb. 1990, 5, 5.
43. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 28.
44. Forsberg & White, 1989-Ending the Cold War, 1990-Ending the Arms Race, DEFENSE &
DISARMAMENT ALTERNATIVES, Dec. 1989, at 2, 2.
45. Can CFE Keep Pace?, VIENNAFAX, Feb. 22, 1990, at 1, 2 (R. Leavitt, ed.).
46. Dean, Planningfor the Next Round of CFE Talks, DEFENSE & DISARMAMENT ALTERNATiVES, Nov. 1989, at 1, 1.
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feeling that confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) must
be viewed as a crucial complement to disarmament and that any CFE
negotiations should be part of the larger framework established by
47
CSCE.
In part because of recent changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet
Union and the United States have been rethinking their past adversarial positions regarding strategic nuclear weapons. This development
has led to the potential for a new partnership in reducing the global
nuclear threat. 48 Some experts attribute the recent breakdown in EastWest political barriers in part to the recent elimination of interme49
diate-range nuclear missiles from Europe.
During 1990 superpower discussions in the realm of strategic arms
focused on a treaty to reduce strategic offensive weapons. 50 The current
framework for the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) was
actually initiated by President Gorbachev and President Reagan at the
1986 Reykjavik summit. Both leaders agreed in principle to reduce
their strategic nuclear arsenals by fifty percent. Although the foundation for START was laid in 1986, the greatest efforts to reach formal
agreement have come during 1990 from Bush and Gorbachev.
The Malta Summit has been hailed by many as a turning point in
superpower negotiations concerning START initiatives. 5 ' Bush committed himself to accelerating the pace of the strategic talks "in order
to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible,
by the 1990 summit."5 2 While the fundamental issues addressed by
START are relatively independent from the political developments in
the Eastern bloc, the recent changes have affected the accelerated pace
of negotiations. 3 In the past, bilateral arms control talks guided the
pace and shape of East-West relations. By comparison, the joint
commitment made by the United States and the Soviet Union at the

47. Genscher, supra note 42, at 5.
48. Nye, Arms Control after the Cold War, FOR. AFF., Winter 1990, at 42, 46. ("As a pattern
of reciprocity develops both sides begin to redefine their interests . . . . The opportunities
presented by the current political climate and the possibility of a return to cold war relations
reinforce the argument for reaching good agreements."). Id. at 46.
49. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed by the superpowers in

1987.
50. For further information about START see Sloan, Arms Control: Negotiations to Reduce
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Weapons, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, updated

Feb. 13, 1990.
51. Keeny, Malta Meeting Charts a New Course for Arms Control, ARms CONTROL TODAX,
Dec. 1989/Jan. 1990, at 11, 11. See also US Ambassador on Malta Summit, (TASS) (Dec. 7,

1989) (NEXIS).
52. Rubin, Malta Summit Makes Waves: Leaders to Seek START, CFE Pacts in 1990, ARMs
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1989/Jan. 1990, at 21, 21.
53. Earle, It's Time to Accelerate START, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 5, 1989, at 21.
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Malta Summit to accelerate START seems to be a response to the
breakneck speed of the demise of communism in Eastern Europe. 54
The Bush Administration has expressed a desire to move ahead with
a treaty while President Gorbachev remains in power. If Gorbachev's
leadership ends, the White House fears a corresponding cessation in
Soviet reform efforts. 55 Furthermore, the extensive political reforms
opposition
occuring in Eastern Europe diminish the likelihood 5 of
6
within the Republican Party to a strategic arms treaty.
But verification remains a major stumbling block to a START
treaty. In order to test methods verifying the number of warheads each
side's ballistic missiles carry, a cooperative inspection program was
agreed to by the superpowers on January 22, 1990. The United States
demonstrated verification methods on its Peacekeeper ICBM and Trident SLBM missiles; the Soviet Union utilized its heavy SS- 18 ICBM
7
and SS-N-23 SLBM.5
Although the START negotiations have moved rapidly, neither
Moscow nor Washington has ever been certain about reaching final
agreement in time for signing at the superpower summit in late May
1990. Instead, the overarching goal which guided START talks in
Geneva, Moscow, and Washington during the months prior to the
May summit, was to resolve all of the major outstanding issues sur8
rounding the conclusion of a treaty."
During talks held in Moscow in early February, Secretary of State
James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
made substantial progress in eliminating the major obstacles remaining
to signing a treaty. 59 The Soviet Union tentatively accepted a United
States-proposed counting rule, which would attribute 10 air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) to each United States bomber, although each
plane will be permitted to carry as many as twenty. 60 Soviet bombers,
for the purposes of verification, will count as carrying a load of eight
ALCMs with a cap of 12 ALCMs. 6' Disagreement remained, however,
54. Superpower Summit Markedby Caution and Small Steps, (Reuters) (Dec. 4, 1989) (NEXIS),
55. McManus & Broder, U.S. FearsEnd to Soviet Reform, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at A1.
56. Gordon, U.S. Shifts on Arms Talks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, at 10, col. 1.
57. Dullforce, Soviet-U.S. Agreement on Inspection of N-Warheads Priorto START, Fin. Times,
Jan. 23, 1990, at 2.
58. Interview with Ambassador Richard Burr, ARms CONTROL TODAY, Feb. 1990, at 3, 4.
59. See generally Bunn & Feinstein, Baker and Shevardnadze Clear START Roadblocks, ARs
CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1990, at 21, 21-22.
60. Previously, there was no agreement concerning the number of missiles to be officially
attributed to U.S. bombers in compliance with a potential treaty because of the difficulty of
verifying the exact number of warheads carried on each plane.
61. Bunn & Feinstein, supra note 59, at 21; see also Soviet and AmericanJoint Statement (TASS)
(Feb. 10, 1990) (NEXIS). The Soviet Union currently wants the right to carry up to 16 missiles
on their bombers despite prior agreement with the U.S. on a maximum of 12. The U.S.'s initial
proposal was also a 16 missile limit, so it is likely the U.S. will concede to such a request.
Toth, Soviets Raise Obstacles to New Arms Pacts, L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
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after the February talks regarding the flight range under which ALCMs
would be excluded from START; the Soviet Union wanted a range of
600 kilometers whereas the United States advocated a range of 1000
62
kilometers.
Outside the direct scope of the treaty itself, the superpowers have
also made progress on the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs). Because of fears over the impossibility of verification, the
United States has consistently refused to include SLCMs within the
START framework.6 3 Instead of incorporating SLCM limitations
within the treaty, Shevardnadze agreed to "politically binding" bilateral declarations in which each side would declare the number of
SLCMs it intended to deploy over a five-year period with annual
updates to follow." The Soviet Union had made a similar concession
in September, 1989, when it agreed to drop any linkage between the
United States Strategic Defense Inititative (SDI) and START, though
it retained the right to abrogate the treaty in the event that the United
States violated the 1972 ABM Treaty through its implementation of
SDI technology.
Despite the significant progress made during the February 1990
discussions in Moscow, several details necessary to a cohesive agreement remained unsettled. The Soviet Union continued to reject the
demand that the treaty include a sublimit of approximately 3300
nuclear warheads carried on ICBMs. The United States has also attempted to include the Soviet Backfire bomber within the treaty, a
position which Moscow rejects. The general issue of verification pro65
cedures was also left largely undefined.
While February 1990 marked the high point in the United StatesSoviet efforts to reach substantial agreement on START, the BakerShevardnadze meeting in Washington in April 1990 saw remarkably
little progress in the strategic arms area. The slowdown in progress
toward a START treaty can be attributed to concerns over German
reunification and Soviet preoccupation with heading off the Lithuanian
62. Bunn & Feinstein, supra note 59, at 21. At the February summit, the U.S. offered to
lower the threshold of ALCMs to 800 kilometers. "U.S. officials believe that ALCMs should be
treated differently from ballistic missiles [sic] warheads under START's overall warhead ceiling

...their rationale is that ALCMs travel more slowly to their targets than ballistic missiles and
therefore do not pose a threat as disarming first-strike weapons." Mann, Soviets Ready to Resolve
START Pact Despite Clash over Cruise Missiles, AVITION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 23, 1990,
at 66, 66.
63. The definition of SLCM also remains unresolved. "The United States defines them as
nuclear-equipped only with a range in excess of 300 kilometers. The Soviets want them defined
as both nuclear and conventionally armed with a range of 600 kilometers or more." Bunn &
Feinstein, supra note 59, at 66.
64. Id. at 22.
65. Gordon, Upheaval in the East: Arms Control; U.S. and Soviets Appear to Agree on Main
Elements of Arms Treaty, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1990, at Al, col 4.
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secession. 66 The major outcome of the April discussions was the fixing
of an official date for the summit-May 30 through June 3, 1990 in
Washington. At a press conference following his meeting with Baker,
Shevardnadze pointed to the settling of an official date as a sign that
relations between the superpowers had not deteriorated because of the
sudden turmoil in Lithuania. 67 Also quite positive was the joint interest expressed in continuing bilateral negotiations after the conclusion of START, although a timetable for START II remained sketchy.68
The United States was the first to come forth with specific proposals
for START II. Bush sent a letter to Gorbachev in early April 1990
detailing his proposal for the elimination of all land-based strategic
missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads. This proposal included
two stages of reduction. The first phase, which would be incorporated
into START, is the destruction of several dozen Soviet SS-24 missiles
currently deployed on railroad cars. Simultaneously, the United States
would scrap plans to shift fifty MX missiles from silos to railroad
transports. 69 A subsequent accord would eliminate an estimated 2000
warheads in the United States and approximately 5930 warheads in
the Soviet Union. 70 Although the implementation of a START treaty
would decrease both nations' nuclear arsenal by approximately onethird, each state currently plans to develop and deploy more accurate
land-based missiles carrying multiple warheads. 7 1 The potential elimination of missiles possessing multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) would lessen the shared fear of a preemptive
strike. 72
In the wake of Bush's one-sided proposal, the Soviet Union also
renewed its call for legally binding limits on the number of SLCMs
deployed by each nation, an area where the United States retains
superiority.7 3 Regardless of the final shape and substance of any START
II negotiations, the open agreement between the superpowers to engage in such talks indicates that a mutual belief in completing START
during 1990 still exists.

66. Soviets May be Backsliding in Arms Talks, (UPI) (Apr. 12, 1990) (NEXIS); see also Grier,

U.S., Soviet Talks Mired in Details, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 9, 1990, at 1.
67. De Lama, Scrap NATO, Warsaw Pact, Soviets Urge, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 7, 1990, at

1.
68. De Lama, Summit Dates Set, But Arms Pact Unlikely, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 6, 1990, at
1, see also Shannon, Soviets Looking Beyond START Nuclear Pact, L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1990, at
1
1.

69.
70.
71.
72.
4,4.

Smith, Soviets Cool to Land Based Proposals, Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1990, at Al.
Id.
On Arms: START and START Again, N.Y. Times Editorial, Feb. 14, 1990, at A24.
Warnke, Arms Control in a New Age, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1989/Jan. 1990, at

73. Why Risk START now, Needlessly?, N.Y. Times Editorial, Apr. 12, 1990, at A22.
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While the future of bilateral strategic offensive arms reductions has
at least been delineated and formalized, the question of the continued
presence of NATO's short-range nuclear forces in Western Europe
remains unanswered. Notwithstanding implementation of the INF
Treaty a variety of NATO short-range nuclear delivery systems (SNF),
nuclear artillery shells, and an outmoded LANCE missile system
remain.7 4 The current prospect of the reunification of Germany raises
many questions about the necessity of NATO's nuclear presence in
75
Western Europe.
NATO has in some respects adopted a wait-and-see approach to the
changes in Eastern Europe and Germany in particular. On the issue
of SNF, the United States still displays a reticence to move forward
with reductions and will not commit to formal negotiations until the
goals of CFE are achieved. 7 6 At the Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar
in January 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin L.
Powell, stated that the United States remained committed to a strategy
of flexible response that required "a wide range of capabilities from
conventional through nuclear." 77 The official reason for the continued
presence of nuclear weapons in the European theater is to guarantee
linkage to the wider spectrum of United States nuclear forces which
7s
compose the strategic triad.
Furthermore, France and Great Britain are improving and expanding their strategic capabilities unhindered since none of their weapons
are included in the INF agreement. It is estimated, for example, that
by the late 1990's Britain will have expanded its arsenal from 62 to
512 warheads. 79 At some point, all powers negotiating must address
the issues raised by these forces.
Although NATO is hedging on the issue of short range nuclear
weapons, both the FRG and the Soviet Union have expressed a desire
to eliminate SNF prior to the reunification of the two Germanys. s0
NATO has not committed itself to any official discussion with regard
to reducing SNF, but a meeting of the Alliance's Nuclear Planning
Group on May 9-10, 1990, established the preliminary groundwork
74. Sloan, CONGRESSioNAL RFSEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, NATO Nuclear Strategy, Forces
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75. Id. at 8.

76. Text of Press Conference by U.S. Delegate to CSBM, Chairman Ambassador John J. Maresca
and Lieutenant George J. Butler, Director within Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Plans and
Policies, at Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar, Jan. 16, 1990, at 5.
77. Powell, Speech in Defense Issues, at 3; see also Text of Press Conference by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell, at Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar, Jan. 17, 1990,
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for future bilateral discussions on the topic.8 1 Essentially, NATO is
gearing up for future talks in anticipation of a Conventional Forces
Agreement.
The aspect of NATO's nuclear presence in Western Europe which
has drawn the greatest dissent is the Bush administration's aborted
plan to replace the outmoded Lance missiles with a new missile system,
a Follow-on-to Lance (FOTL). 82 The FRG has consistently opposed
NATO's plans to deploy FOTL. A United States-FRG debate during
the spring of 1989 over the deployment of 995 FOTL launchers led
NATO to table the decision until 1992.83 Chancellor Kohl stated in
early 1989 that an official decision would be delayed until after the
German elections in 1990.84 Other German officials articulated similar
viewpoints, stating publicly that there was no need for nuclear modernization in light of the crumbling Warsaw Pact. FRG foreign minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher has also preferred to let the issue die its
own death at the hands of the continued changes in Eastern Europe. 8 5
When the United States formally announced in mid-April 1990
that it had dropped its plans for Lance modernization, it did appear
as if FOTL's death had, in fact, occurred. Experts attribute the sudden
halt in the design of the missile to Bush's "final realization" of the
situation in Germany, where short-range nuclear weapons which are
86
aimed at part of a soon to be unified nation no longer make sense.
Although the Lance modernization plan has been cancelled, it appears
unlikely that NATO will agree to the complete elimination of nuclear
forces from Western Europe. In particular, Great Britain and the
United States remain committed to the development of a new nuclear87
tipped tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM).
A unified Germany's future role in Europe and particularly its
relationship to NATO is another subject causing much debate between
81. NATO to Dearth Short-Range Missile Modernization Sources (Reuters) (Apr. 26, 1990)

(NEXIS).
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(75 miles). At present, 88 obsolescent Lance launchers coupled with 700 nuclear warheads are
dispersed throughout West European NATO sites. Over two-thirds of these launchers arc
deployed in the FRG and targeted at the GDR. Id.
83. Id. at 1; see also Warnke, supra note 72, at 5.
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the superpowers. In addition to seeing a nuclear free Germany, the
Soviet Union would like to see Germany as a nonparticipant in NATO.
At his April meeting with Baker in Washington, Shevardnadze
dropped his explicit demand that a united Germany remain neutral.
Instead, he suggested a variety of "creative options" for Germany's
political and military future. At the top of his list was a proposal to
expand the role of the thirty-five-nation CSCE to better incorporate
the Warsaw Pact. In addition, he suggested that Germany might
remain a member of both alliances; a proposal which both Germanies
and the United States reject completely.
Against the Soviet view, the FRG and the United States would like
a reunified Germany to retain its membership in NATO in order to
preserve political stability in Europe. 8s The United States has recommended that the "two-plus-four" interalliance negotiations allow the
two Germanys to collaborate on internal decisions about the substance
and process of reunification. In conjunction with this internal housekeeping, both Germanies would consult France, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and the United States regarding external questionsAs 9
External questions would include discussion of Germany's future role
in NATO.
Genscher, during a visit to Washington in April 1990 again stated
that Bonn supported a united Germany's continued presence in
NATO. To supplement such a membership though, Genscher called
for a strengthened agenda for CSCE that included: a European center
for the early detection and political settlement of conflicts, an expanded
Council of Europe, and regular meetings of CSCE ministers. Although
Genscher reaffirmed Germany's commitment to NATO, he also stated
that a "two-plus-four" framework would not be an appropriate mechanism for deciding upon a united Germany's future. 90
The United States' vision of a European security framework appears
to embody a "parallel path" approach. The two "paths" consist of
preserving NATO while simultaneously strengthening and expanding
the CSCE. Such a dual emphasis would allow the United States to
respond to whatever political and military posture the Soviet Union
may adopt in the future-either retrenching and adhering to previous
positions or reforming and increasingly embracing democratic structures. 9 1 This approach would be remarkably consistent with Genscher's
vision of European security.

88.
89.
1990,
90.
91.

Grier, Germany Tops Bermuda Agenda, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 14, 1990, at 1.
Grier, Alliance Plan for Life After German Unity, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 14,
at 1.
Barber, supra note 85, at 4.
Interview with Stanley R. Sloan (Apr. 23, 1990).

HarvardInternationalLaw Journal / Vol, 31
In the future, the superpowers' ability to reach agreement on multilateral issues such as the role of a united Germany within European
security frameworks is much more limited than their ability to effect
change in the strategic arms arena, where the negotiations, for the
most part, remain bilateral. But the rapid pace of political change in
Europe has led the United States and the Soviet Union to become
increasingly involved in multilateral decision making, where new
actors such as the two Germanies have a more prominent voice. As a
result, both the Soviet Union and the United States have adopted
more of a wait-and-see approach to the European nuclear situation,
where their activities have been in reponse to political changes rather
92
than self-created initiatives.
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92. Id. ("Politics in the street have set the pace of arms control. Political events have outrun
bureaucratic mechanisms. The preferred approach of the Bush administration has been caution.
The superpowers have adopted a more responsive approach rather than creative leadership.").

